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COMMENTARY
Reflections on the Presidential Clemency Power
RicHARD A. SAITERmAN*

Introduction
Ten years ago our nation was torn by a civil and legal strife paralleled,
perhaps, only by the crisis that challenged the nation during the Civil War.
For the first time in history, a United States president had resigned from office.
For the first time in recent history, the United States military, the State Department and other departments of the executive branch, and the Congress all
had come under broad, scathing criticism. Some critics argued that as a nation
we were wrong in becoming involved in the Vietnam War; other critics were
disturbed by the fact that for the first time in our nation's history, we either
had lost or were losing a war. Social institutions that had traditionally served
as a stabilizing force in our society-churches, universities, and even art and
cultural centers-experienced the social tremors. Even today the outlines
resulting from tremors of the Vietnam era have not been fully mapped.
President Ford, like President Lincoln at the end of the Civil War, faced
a formidable task as he took office. Fortunately, President Ford had the
courage, the presence of mind, and enough experience with governmental processes to competently face the task, and he did not attempt merely to muddle
through. Two of his more important decisions resulted in the pardon for President Nixon' and a grant of clemency to persons who had committed military
and civilian crimes directly related to the Vietnam War.' This article focuses
on the latter decision-one that has never received substantial public attention and which has attracted only nominal interest in the legal community.
The catalyst that led to this article was my ten-year reunion with those connected with the Presidential Clemency Board. Our reunion, characterized by
gentle conversations beside a mirror-like pond in a prosperous Washington
suburb, contrasted starkly with the tense, hurried atmosphere of our earlier
work together on the Clemency Board. The pressures of the earlier atmosphere
left us only limited time to contemplate of analyze. Since 1974, some members
of the Board have written and spoken publicly about their experiences. Very
* B.A., University of Minnesota; J.D., Columbia Law School; LL.M., New York University
School of Law. As a Lieutenant in the U.S. Navy, J.A.G.C., served as a military attorney to
the Presidential Clemency Board, the White House, Washington, D.C. Partner, Saliterman &

Antrim, Minneapolis, Minn.-Ed.
1. President Gerald Ford pardoned former President Richard Nixon for all crimes he might
have committed against the United States during his presidency. See Proclamation No. 4311,
39 Fed. Reg. 32,601-02 (1974).
2. See L. BASKm & W. STRAuss, CHANCE AND CmcumsTANcE 210-16 (1978).
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few, however, have come to grips with or analyzed the legal significance of
what occurred.
The Program
President Ford first announced in August of 1974 that he would consider
the possibility of granting clemency or of pardoning on a conditional basis
those guilty of offenses related to the Vietnam War.3 At that time, Congresswoman Bella Abzug represented the absolutist view in Congress that complete clemency was necessary and in the best interests of our nation. 4 Others
in Congress and in the Washington community, however, regarded a clemency
program as an insult to those servicemen and women who had served their
country honorably. Despite this polarization of Congress, President Ford
moved forward with a program of conditional clemency,' which, according
to a Gallup Poll released in August of 1975, was supported by approximately
47 percent of the American public.6
The Presidential Proclamation and Executive Order for Clemency was issued
on September 16, 1974 and provided relief for those facing sentencing, those
whose charges were pending, or those in danger of possible apprehension and
who came within the terms of the order.7 Groups of offenders covered by
the order included (1) fugitive draft offenders, (2) fugitive military absence
offenders, (3) convicted draft offenders, and (4) former servicemen discharged
for unauthorized absences.' As an additional limitation, only those persons
whose offenses had occurred between August 4, 1964 and March 28, 1973
were eligible for the program. The group of eligible offenders was estimated
to number some 113,000 identifiable individuals and another 250,000 who
could not be identified because they failed to register for the draft.9
To implement the clemency program, President Ford assembled a group
of private citizens representing a broad spectrum of ideological backgrounds
to serve on the Clemency Board and to work to "bind the nation's wounds."',0
It was hoped that the Board would serve to provide a middle ground between
the divided and misrepresentative congressional views. At the start, the Board's
role was limited to reviewing cases involving convicted draft offenders and
discharged military offenders and making recommendations as to the disposition of each case to the President. The President would then use the authority
of his office to grant clemency in appropriate cases by specific order.

3. Id.

4. See L. BASKm & W. STRAuss, RECONCILIATION AFTER VIETNAM 13 (1977) (A Report of
the Vietnam Offender Study, University of Notre Dame Center for Civil Rights) [hereinafter

cited as RECONCILIATION AFTER VIETNAM].
5. See BASKIR & STRAuss, supra note 2, at 210-13.
6. RECONCILIATION AFTER VIETNAM, supra note 4, at 25.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 28.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 37.
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The PresidentialClemency Power

The presidential power to grant clemency inheres in the constitutional power
of the President to grant pardons." Article II, section 2 of the Constitution
confers on the President the power to "grant reprieves and pardons for offenses
against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment." Since the President is also charged with the duty to "take care that the Laws be faithfully
executed,"' 2 the President has a unique role in deciding whether to prosecute
a crime. The President's decision to prosecute is within the "executive authority
and absolute discretion" of the President.' 3 No other individual or body shares
in that discretion.' 4 Because the power resides in the President alone,' his
exercises of the pardon power are not subject to judicial review.
The executive pardon power is a carryover from the English common law
practice recognizing the power of the Crown to have mercy on those who
had offended the law. In Ex parte Garland,'6 the Supreme Court recognized
that the presidential power to pardon contained in article II was essentially
the same in operation and effect as the power that had existed in England.'
The Framers of our Constitution recognized the potential breadth of the pardon power, but the proposed limitations on the exercise of that power (such
as requiring concurrent consent by the Senate or excepting the crime of treason)
were ultimately defeated at the Constitutional Convention. ' Thus, the pardon power, a power uncharacteristic of the constitutional framework of checks
and balances and limited democracy, was carried over into the Constitution.
The Framers believed that recognition of a power to pardon in the executive
would serve a number of purposes. Alexander Hamilton explained the "chief
reason" for adopting the power: "[I]n seasons of insurrection or rebellion,"
Hamilton said, "there are often critical moments, when a well-timed offer
of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquility of the commonwealth; and which, if suffered to pass unimproved, it may never be possible
afterwards to recall." 9 In addition to promoting tranquility in times of strife,
the Framers sought to afford the executive the power to correct perceived
injustices. As Hamilton explained: "The criminal code of every country partakes so much of necessary severity, that without an easy access to exceptions
11. U.S. CONST. art. II,
12. U.S. CONST. art. II,

§ 2.
§ 3.

13. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (citing Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 454 (1869)).
14. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTnONA LAW § 4-10, at 193 (1978) (noting that the
only limitation on the President's pardoning power is impeachment).
15. See, e.g., Murphy v. Ford, 390 F. Supp. 1372 (W.D. Mich. 1975) (upholding President
Ford's pardon of former President Nixon).
16. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
17. See also United States v. Wilson, 33 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833) (Chief Justice Marshall
noting the congruity of the pardon power in England and the United States).
18. 2 M. FARRAND, RECoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 419 (1911). See also
Schick v. Reid, 419 U.S. 256, 262 (1974).
19. Tim FEDERALIST No. 74 (A. Hamilton), reprinted in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (Bantam
ed. 1982).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1985

OKLAHOMA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 38:257

in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary
and cruel." 2 Thus, inclusion of this broad and unchecked power not only
permitted the President a means by which to restore domestic tranquility, it
also allowed the executive to excuse those who were "unfortunately" guilty.
The pardon power is so broad and unchecked that it indeed resembles a
power of the sovereign. The power extends to all offenses in violation of federal
law2" and to offenses against the military.22 The power may be exercised at
any time after the commission of an offense, even before an indictment has
issued." The President may pardon whole classes of offenders, "4 and he may
restore all civil rights to those pardoned. 2 5 While the presidential power to
pardon does not exclude the power of Congress to pass acts of general
amnesty,26 neither can Congress modify, abridge, or diminish the President's
power.

27

Under the program adopted by the Ford administration, not all offenders
were given a full pardon remitting all punishment. 28 Rather, the program
focused on "clemency," a term denoting mildness or leniency. Some of the
offenders were required to do alternative service as a condition of their
clemency. The conditional exercise of the pardon power was upheld by the
Supreme Court in Schick v. Reid.2 In that case, the Court ruled that the
President could condition the commutation of a death sentence on the
prisoner's acceptance of a life term of imprisonment without possibility of
parole. The Court reasoned that since the pardon power is an expressly
enumerated constitutional provision, "its limitations, if any, must be found
in the Constitution itself."' 30 Absent any such limitations, it was perfectly acceptable to condition the exercise of the power on the offender's agreement
to a lesser punishment.
Although the pardon power is capable of beneficial, and indeed necessary,
exercise, its expansive use must not be taken lightly. Such an expansive power
is inherently dangerous if not used with prudence. This concept of discretionary and absolute power should be of special interest to lawyers, whose
profession and perspectives are governed by the "rule of law" and the ideal
of "equal justice under the law." The experience of the Clemency Board at
the end of the Vietnam War helps us, as lawyers, to understand the nature
of this vast power and to guide its future exercise.
20. Id.
21. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1872).
22. See Schick v. Reid, 419 U.S. 256, 267 (1974).
23. See D: parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1872).
25. See, e.g., Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1867).
26. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601 (1896).
27. Schick v. Reid, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974).
28. A "full" pardon operates to remit all punishment, while a true amnesty simply overlooks
the offense. See Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 95 (1915).
29. 419 U.S. 256 (1974).
30. Id. at 267. See also Note, The ConditionalPresidentialPardon, 28 STAN. L. REv. 149
(1975) (suggesting limitations on the power to pardon conditionally).
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The references herein to shortcomings or law-related imperfections in the
use of this power following the war are provided to highlight areas worthy
of special sensitivity in such future exercises, not to characterize its overall
use or the net effect of its use under President Ford.
Equitable, Comprehensive, and Conclusive Exercise
of the Clemency Power
The exercise of the clemency power, in practical effect, imposes an ad hoc
legal regime on a particular factual setting. If the regime is to best serve its
purpose, it must strive for integrity and respect, and it must produce the results
it was created to obtain. The Vietnam Clemency Program did not completely
fulfill these purposes. As noted above, an estimated 113,000 offenders came
within the coverage of the program, and another 250,000 individuals perhaps
could have been within the program but could not be identified because they
had not registered for the draft. Despite the large number of individuals eligible for clemency, the voluntary program resulted in only 27,000 individual
applications for-Clemency, 21,800 of which were from eligible offenders. Three
years after the program ended, there remained some 80,000 Vietnam-era offenders who still faced the risk of prosecution and the attendant loss of civil
rights, or who carried with them the badge of an undesirable military discharge.
The effectiveness of the Clemency Board was also somewhat limited by
the conditional nature of the clemency granted to those eligible applicants. 3'
The program was criticized by some as inequitable because some offenders
were not required to do alternative service. Some individuals, for example,
received a clemency discharge without a substituted term of alternative service. Others, however, would be required to do alternative service after a hearing on the merits. Some differences in result were attributable more to the
manner and place of surrender to authorities than to the merits of particular
cases. This resulted in some perception that the government was not giving
the same bargain to all who were similarly situated.
Another possible weakness of the program was the lack of thorough followup once a term of alternative service was imposed. Many of the offenders
who were required to perform alternative service as a condition of clemency
were not pressed to complete the term of service. At one time the Defense
Department estimated, for example, that of the approximately 10,000 fugitive
deserters eligible for clemency and required to do alternative service, only
6,000 individuals applied, and only 500 actually completed the term of alternative service. 32 It has been suggested that those who failed to complete their
terms of service could be prosecuted for fraudulently obtaining a discharge.
There is no evidence, however, that the Pentagon ever followed through by
pressing such charges. A similar failure to follow through occurred in the
civilian sector where many offenders simply lost interest in the program, or,
believing that the federal government had lost interest, returned to the
31. REcoNcILuATIoN A=rma VmTAm, supra note 4, at 41-42.
32. BASKIR & STRAUSS, supra note 2, at 220.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1985

OKLAHOMA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 38:257

Kafkaesque world of underground living in fear of federal prosecution.
The Clemency Program's inability to encourage participation by more offenders is harder to understand. The limited participation may have been due
in part to a misconception of the underlying assumptions of certain officials
charged with the administration of the program in the early stages. Much
of the rhetoric in Congress and in Washington reflected an erroneous belief
that those who evaded the draft and disobeyed the laws of the military were
predominantly white, well-educated, and ideologically opposed to the Vietnam War. The experience of the Clemency Board proved quite the contrary.
As one commentator has summarized: "Almost half of all draft evaders were
members of minority groups who never registered for the draft. Three-quarters
of the deserters were high school drop-outs, and less than one percent ever
graduated from college. Most offenses were motivated primarily by personal
or family problems. ' 33 With regard to military deserters in particular, it has
been observed that:
For every one of the 7,000 servicemen who fled when ordered to
Vietnam, there were three who left American duty stations after
completing full tours in Vietnam. Many served with distinction,
only to "desert" when they failed to receive adequate post-combat
rehabilitation. Twenty percent of all "deserters" served full Vietnam tours. . . . Very few "desertion" offenses were connected
convicted of deser24 servicemen were
with service in Vietnam ....
3

tion to avoid hazardous duty in Vietnam.

1

Thus, the Clemency Board was born amid misconceptions by many about
the nature of the offenders with whom it was assigned to deal. An effective
clemency program must at the very least ensure that everyone involved completely understands the character of the offenders involved and then tailor
the program to attract participation by that kind of individual. Only then
can such a program claim to make a comprehensive effort.
It should be noted that the problems of the Ford administration clemency
program were, to a very large extent, attributable to the very nature of the
war and the times themselves. The burden of the Vietnam War fell heavily
and primarily on Americans of middle and lower-middle socioeconomic classes.
Many of the offenses were related to simple immaturity, lack of social
acculturation, or the less than accommodating social and political environment that characterized the United States at that time. This was the "wounded generation" and many young adults did not trust any governmental
program.3 5 This lack of trust clearly hindered the program's effectiveness.
It would seem wise for any future program to make an all-out attempt to
create a certain amount of trust among offenders themselves. This aim is

33. RECONcwrIowI AwrAim VErENAm, supra note 4, at 2.
34. Id. at 2.

35. See

THE WOUNDED GENERATION ix-xii (A. Horne ed. 1981).
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perhaps best obtained by simply being direct with the offenders concerning
their alternatives.
The Need for Integration With the Military Justice System
A fundamental premise underlying the military justice system is that the
use of courts-martial and discharge proceedings should be a last resort when
the system is operating properly. Good military and civilian leadership,
especially at post-Vietnam tour-of-duty phases, could have averted many
military offenses ultimately directed to the Clemency Board. Military leadership became the focus of much criticism following the Vietnam War, and
the military legal system expeditiously responded by reevaluating its priorities.
During the period of the Clemency Board's operation, the military, in an
effort to cut costs, plea bargained many bad conduct discharge cases that
came to the attention of the Board. 36 Although the military justice system
certainly operated equitably and even admirably for the most part, this emphasis on action dictated by dollar costs seems inappropriate and ultimately
detrimental to the military.
An additional problem of the Clemency Board vis-a-vis the military justice
system was the frequent inability of the Board to act because of the limited
number of offenses against military law that were subject to clemency. The
Clemency Board's "jurisdiction" was limited to offenses related to desertion,
of which there were relatively very few. Offenses other than desertion that
may have been equally deserving of clemency, such as insubordination, failure
to obey rules, and assault, could not be reviewed by the Board.
Finally, and of somewhat broader interest, in an evaluation of the relationship of the clemency program to military justice, it might be noted that our
experience indicates that despite much publicity to the contrary, American
soldiers on the whole performed admirably and in accordance with military
law in Vietnam. Also, and perhaps most important for the future, in organizing a clemency program there was and is the overriding concern that military
justice may not be totally forgiving if it is to function under wartime conditions. The impact of this forgiveness factor on military performance has not
been fully put to the test in modern times.
Coordination With Law Enforcement Authorities
The Clemency Board's experience also indicates a need for emphasis on
coordination of the clemency program with other law enforcement programs.
An estimated 250,000 people never registered for the draft and were never
prosecuted. Another 110,000 burned their draft cards, refused induction, or
committed other offenses against the draft but were never charged with any
crime." Of the 210,000 individuals referred to the Justice Department for
possible draft law prosecution, only 25,000 were indicted. Of those, only 10,000

36. BASKIR & STRAUSS, supra note 2, at 216.
37. RECONCILIATION AFTER VIETNAM, supra note 4, at 15.
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were tried, and 8,800 were convicted. 38 It is estimated that for every draft
offender who went to prison, almost 200 went free." Moreover, the United
States Attorney's Offices were reluctant to prosecute clemency program alternative service dropouts. Even worse, the Justice Department dismissed
thousands of draft offender cases without informing the defendants that they
40
were free to live their lives without the fear of prosecution. This problem
of coordination of the efforts of the Clemency Board and those of other law
enforcement officials seriously damaged the effectiveness of the program. As
one commentator has observed: "[L]ike the Defense Department, the Justice
Department saw the Clemency Program not as a way of extending official
'4
forgiveness but as a way of trimming its backlog of fugitive cases." ' To best
promote the goals of efficiency and justice, any future clemency program must
be in full cadence with other law enforcement programs and vice versa.
Relation to the Court System
The Clemency Board's experience points up the need for effective coordination of judicial authority. For instance, Vietnam-era offenders were, of
course, free to plead guilty to crimes against the draft in the federal courts.
Under rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, those willing to
plead guilty could determine their own destiny by going to the district court
of their choice. Since some judges clearly were more sympathetic than others
to the plight of draft offenders, the offender could seek out those judges in
the hope of avoiding even the alternative service. Many offenders did just
that and escaped punishment altogether. The inequity of such a result is
apparent. Disposition of draft offenders should not be determined on the basis
of the offender's guile or luck. Any future clemency program must implement a coordination procedure with the federal court system to avoid this
end-run around the clemency authority.
Conclusion
It is clear that the Clemency Program had some deficiencies. However, President Ford's decision to exercise the power of clemency was consistent with
its exercise as contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution. America was
in turmoil. The exercise of the clemency power in this instance did contribute
to alleviating national stress and restoring tranquility. The decision to exercise the power was also motivated by the desire to lend justice a human element and forgive those who, in Hamilton's words, were the victims of "unfortunate guilt." Nonetheless, it must not be forgotten that the power to pardon is a broad discretionary power that defies the rule of law. As lawyers,
we have a role to perform in ensuring that the power is properly motivated
38. Id. at 3.
39. Id. at 15.

40. Id. at 36.
41. Id. at 34.
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and fairly and effectively administered. Clemency power is like a parachute
for very troubled times, and we should be sure that our gear is in order if
and when the parachute may have to be sprung open in the future.
In retrospect, we might ask whether our nation is now stronger because
of the Vietnam War and the resulting clemency program. Constitutional Law
Professor William Y. Elliot sheds some light on a possible answer. In his
essay on amnesty, Professor Elliot concludes:
It is clear, therefore, that amnesties are effective as legal protection only in constitutional states under the rule of law which courts
can enforce, or in absolute monarchies or dictatorships where the
ruler is of tried good faith. Wherever the government feels itself
insecure they are of doubtful worth. In fact, from the standpoint
of the group in power, amnesties are politically expedient only when
the regime is safe from further violence, and when clemency may
not be mistaken for weakness. 2
The use of the clemency power ten years ago, despite the weaknesses referred
to herein, not only was timely, it was and is a reflection of the overall strength
and resilience of our legal and political system.

42. Elliot, Amnesty, in H

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TIM SOCIAL SCIENCES
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